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NOTES
HONG KONG AFTER 1997: AN EXPERIMENTAL
GOVERNMENT PRACTICING CAPITALISM WITHIN A
SOCIALIST SOVEREIGN
I. INTRODUCTION
Hong Kong, despite its local land restraints,' plays a vital role as a
partner in world trade. Located in the southern part of mainland
China, it is strategically posted along an important trade route of Far
East Asia. Hong Kong is a host to many multinational business con-
glomerates and is the thirteenth largest trading entity in the world.2
In the late 1970s, the termination of the New Territories Lease'
was drawing near and the British government was unable to grant new
land leases beyond 1997. Many investors feared that the expiration of
this lease would destroy the vitality of Hong Kong.' As a result, the
economy of the colony plummeted.5 In order to alleviate the uncer-
1. HONG KONG GOV'T INFO. SERVICES, HONG KONG 1987, at 1, 274 (1987) [hereinafter
HONG KONG 87]. The size of the colony is not much more than 1000 kilometers (about
400 square miles). It is comprised of the Hong Kong (Victoria) Island itself, the Kowloon
peninsula, the New Territories and some outlying islands. Topographically, the colony is
rather hilly, with a limited amount of land suitable for use and development. A consider-
able part of such land had to be reclaimed from the sea. Id.
2. Id. at 1.
3. Convention with China respecting an Extension of Hong Kong outer, June 9, 1898,
China-Great Britain, 90 British and Foreign State Papers 17 [hereinafter New Territo-
ries Lease]. The New Territories, which comprise about 92% of the total land area of the
colony, was leased from China by Great Britain for 99 years beginning July 1, 1898. See
also infra note 26 and accompanying text.
4. THE WHITE PAPER: A DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA ON THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG, Sept. 26, 1984, para. 5 (on file at the office of the
N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. It consists of an introduc-
tion, the Joint Declaration, the three Annexes, the associated exchange of Memoranda
and Explanatory Notes.
5. Hong Kong Future, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1983, at 52. The Heng Seng Stock Ex-
change Index, an indicator of the strength of the colony's economy, fell nearly 50% in
1982.
N.Y.L. Scn. J. INT'L & CoMp. L.
tainty caused by the 1997 deadline, the British Government initiated
diplomatic negotiations with the People's Republic of China
("China").6
On September 24, 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher met with the Chairman of China, Deng Xiaoping, in Beijing
("Peking") to open discussions about the future of Hong Kong.' Two
years of intense negotiations between the two nations culminated in
the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration ("Joint Declara-
tion").8 The Joint Declaration, drafted with the mutual intention of
maintaining the prosperity of Hong Kong, went into effect on May 27,
1985 when the signatories exchanged ratification instruments. It was
simultaneously registered by both countries at the United Nations on
June 12, 1985.1
By this Joint Declaration, Hong Kong, one of the few remaining
British colonies, is to be returned to the sovereign of China on July 1,
1997.10 Hong Kong will then become a Special Administrative Region
("SAR") of China, having its own government and legislature, and op-
erating with a relatively high degree of autonomy.11 According to some
commentators, the continued prosperity of Hong Kong in the coming
years will depend largely, if not exclusively, upon the political and eco-
nomic stability of China and its adherence to the letter and spirit of
the Joint Declaration.1"
This Note begins with a discussion of the future of Hong Kong by
taking a brief retrospective look at the historical background of the
colony and its transformation from a tiny fishing village into a major
international trade mart. The next section presents an analysis of the
events surrounding the signing of the Joint Declaration. Important
provisions of the declaration will be discussed and emphasis will be
6. WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, para. 6.
7. Id. para. 8.
8. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Ques-
tion of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, United Kingdom-China, 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20
(Cmd. 9352) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
9. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 40. Ratification refers not only to an international
procedure through which an agreement enters into effect, but also a process whereby a
state formally recognizes a treaty. A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 129 (1961).
10. Joint Declaration, supra note 8, para. 2.
11. Id. para. 3(2); see infra note 61 and accompanying text for a discussion of SAR
and its responsibilities.
12. See, e.g., Note, An Economic Analysis of Capital Flight in Hong Kong, 17 N.Y.U.
INT'L L. & POL. 683, 714-15 (1985); Day, The Recovery of Hong Kong by The People's
Republic of China - A Fifty Year Experiment in Capitalism and Freedom, 11 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 625, 648 (1984).
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given to the future constitutional arrangement of the SAR government.
Because the political climate of China exerts a detrimental effect upon
Hong Kong, the current political and economic reforms that are taking
place in the Chinese politburo will be given an extensive review. Be-
cause the future of the Taiwanese government is at least tangentially
related to China's modernization policy, the last section of this Note
will give a cursory overview of China's attempt to reunite Taiwan with
the mainland.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the early nineteenth century, Hong Kong was described as "a
barren island with hardly a house on it;" 5 it had no natural resources
other than its magnificent deep-water harbor." Hong Kong's develop-
ment into a commercial seaport started in the 1840s when Britain
hoisted its flag on the island and established the colony as its perma-
nent outpost. 5
The British acquisition of Hong Kong was the result of three trea-
ties"8 signed with the Manchu government. 7 The first Anglo-Chinese
military encounter began as a result of Great Britain's attempt to bal-
ance its trade deficit with Chinese merchants by exchanging opium for
Chinese goods." After China seized some 20,000 crates of opium in an
effort to stop the illegal trade practice, the British declared war. 9 Con-
sequently, British troops advanced up the Yangtze River, threatening
to assault Nanjing ("Nanking").2 0 The military conflict was ended by
the Treaty of Nanjing, under which the Hong Kong Island was ceded
13. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 296 (quoting former British Foreign Secretary
Lord Palmerston). The population of approximately 3650 was scattered over 20 villages
and hamlets and an additional 2000 fisherman lived aboard wooden boats called sam-
pans. Id. at 295.
14. Id. at 295. Victoria Harbour, strategically located on the trade routes of the Far
East, was Hong Kong's one natural asset. From the outset, Britain intended it as a mer-
cantile station. Id.
15. Id.
16. WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, para. 3.
17. The Manchu (Ch'ing) government was a former ruling dynasty in China. The
Manchus were tribesmen that arose to power along the northeastern frontiers of China
during the late 16th and 17th centuries. Their formidable military forces succeeded in
creating a strong rival empire which led to the eventful conquering of China. For a de-
tailed historical summary of the Manchu government, see 6 COLLIER ENCYCLOPEDIA 321-
36 (1985).
18. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 295.
19. Id. The infamous Opium War began in 1839 and lasted until 1842. Id.
20. Id. at 296.
1989]
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to Great Britain in perpetuity."
The second Anglo-Chinese war erupted in 1859 when the British
envoy headed by Sir Frederick Bruce was fired upon while en route to
Beijing, where Sir Bruce was to present his credentials to the Chinese
Emperor." The Convention of Peking, signed in 1860, ended the hos-
tilities.2" This treaty secured the southern part of the Kowloon Penin-
sula and Stonecutters Island in perpetuity to the British crown.,
By the second Convention of Peking, which was concluded in 1898,
the New Territories were leased to the British for a term of ninety-nine
years.2 5 Britain's primary objective, as stated in the convention papers,
was to secure the defense and protection of the colony."' As a result of
these three agreements signed by the Chinese and British govern-
ments, the present geographical boundaries of the colony were estab-
lished in 1898.
The Chinese Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Manchu dynasty
and caused many people to seek refuge in Hong Kong from the unrest
in mainland China.2 7 The Japanese invasion of the southern part of
China during 1938 brought an estimated 1.6 million people fleeing into
the tiny colony.2s In December 1941, Japanese troops invaded Hong
Kong and remained there for three years and eight months.2 ' Many
local residents fled as trade came to a virtual standstill.3 0 After the
Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the British Government
regained governance of the colony.8s
Due to the returning of the former Hong Kong residents, the post-
war years engendered an unprecedented population boom. This was
true especially in the late 1940s, after the Communist party defeated
the Nationalist Government in the civil war."2 As huge numbers of Chi-
21. Id.; Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, China-Great Britain, 30 British and For-
eign State Papers 389.
22. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 296.
23. Id.; Convention of Peking, Oct. 24, 1860, China-Great Britain, 50 British and For-
eign State Papers 10.
24. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 296.
25. Id.; New Territories Lease, supra note 3. The New Territories comprise the area
north of Kowloon extending to the Shenzhen River (the southernmost border of China),
and 235 islands. The Lease expires at midnight June 30, 1997. Id.
26. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 296.
27. Id. at 297.
28. Id. at 298 ("[Alt the height of the influx, about half a million people were sleep-
ing in the streets.").
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. Civil government was finally returned on May 1, 1946 when Sir Mark Young
resumed his interrupted governorship. Id.
32. Id. When the Communist faction headed by Mao Zedong began to win control,
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nese people left the mainland between 1945 and 1950 in fear of the
Communist takeover, Hong Kong's population rose from 0.5 to 2.2
million."3
Although the colony's economy was being aggressively rebuilt, two
events impeded economic progress. First, the Korean War severely
staggered the economy. 4 Second, the United Nations initiated a trade
embargo against China which contained economic sanctions that crip-
pled the main engine of Hong Kong's commerce; namely, its role as a
conduit of trade between China and the outside world.35
Despite the adverse situation, Hong Kong began a dramatic trans-
formation of its economy in the ensuing years.3 6 Foremost among other
factors attributable to this success3 7 was the government's implementa-
tion of a laissez-faire economic policy." In the 1960s, Hong Kong's eco-
nomic surge took definite form and substance."' By 1963, the economy
was generating sufficient savings from its own resources to finance the
capital investment necessary to support its growth." ' Since then, do-
mestic capital investment has never fallen below sixteen percent of the
Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"). Its increase remained unabated un-
til the early 1980s when it reached a high of well over 30%."
Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist party sought refuge in Taiwan. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERI-
CANA 418 (1985).
33. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 2, 298. Hong Kong's current population totals
5.58 million.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Other factors -which contributed to Hong Kong's economic success were as fol-
lows: "(a) existence of the free port and free trade; (b) convertible currency; (c) low taxa-
tion and prudent fiscal policy; (d) favorable location and excellent telecommunication
with other big cities; (e) long accumulation of commercial experience; (f) hard work and
entrepreneurial instinct of the people; (g) flexible labor market." Id. at 8.
38. The government has enacted various statutes regulating the conduct of private
business through its legislative body. These legislative activities are complementary to
the promotion of the private sector in producing goods and services, and are essential to
the functioning of a well-rounded society. Id. at 4, 15. "Together, they make Hong Kong
a free economy, but not one dedicated to the extremes of laissez-faire." Id. at 15.
39. Id. at 4. "Although the 1960s were not free of turmoil, the economy was resilient
enough to emerge beyond these encumbrances and resumed its upward swing." Id.
40. Id. "Approximately 40 percent of the colony's exports were textiles products,
while other exports included electronic products, plastic goods, and products from other
light industries." Id. at 299.
41. GDP can be measured in various ways. In the expenditure approach, it is the sum
of private and government consumption expenditures, gross domestic capital formation
and exports of goods and services, minus imports of goods and services. In the produc-
tion approach, it is the sum of the output of productive units less the value of materials
and service inputs. Id. at 5-6; see also CENSUS & STATISTICS DEPT. OF HONG KONG, ESTI-
1989]
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Of particular importance during this period was Hong Kong's ex-
plosive growth in trade when China opened its markets to external
trade.42 China has become Hong Kong's biggest trading partner, ac-
counting for about twenty-six percent of the colony's total imports and
exports, as compared to its next largest partner, the United States,
which accounts for twenty percent.4 3 Furthermore, the various enter-
prises of Hong Kong have invested extensively in China in recent
years, especially in the developing Special Economic Zones ("SEZ") in
Guangdong and the neighboring provinces of China." In addition,
Hong Kong has been acting as an international gateway for many
Western businesses dealing with China, providing both expert and
technical assistance. 5 Hopefully, this interdependence between Hong
Kong and China will serve as an incentive for China's adherence to the
provisions of the Joint Declaration.
III. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE JOINT DECLARATION AND EVENTS LEADING TO
ITS SIGNING
Prior to the signing of the Declaration, China maintained that
Hong Kong was Chinese territory, and that the enclave was taken by
the British under unequal treaties at a time when China was weak and
defenseless."' As early as 1972, the Chinese Government had communi-
MATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 1966 - 1986, at 5 (1987).
42. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 11.
43. Id. at 12.
44. Id. SEZs are geographically delineated districts in China where a different set of
economic rules apply. "They differ from the rest of the country in two major ways: lib-
eral governmental administrative rules, and special tax incentives." Chu, China's Special
Economic Zones: Expectations and Reality, in AN AMERICAN REVIEW 77 (Summer 1987).
China's main objective in establishing these SEZs is to attract foreign capital and tech-
nology necessary for the domestic production of quality exports. Secondly, the foreign
capital and export earnings will be used to purchase from interior China the necessary
material for production, thereby stimulating overall economic growth. Id. at 79.
45. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 12.
46. The former Communist party secretary general, Hu Yaobang, stated at a news
conference on August 15, 1983:
We consider the so-called Hong Kong treaties to be unequal. But it is a fact
that the treaties exist. Moreover, it is clearly written that the expiration date is
June 30, 1997. Therefore, we do not intend to bring forward or postpone this
date. We will recover Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. As far as China is concerned,
our attitude is one of respect for history.
Johnson, The Mousetrapping of Hong Kong, 24 ASIAN SURV. 887, 890 (1984).
For a more extensive analysis of the Chinese viewpoint, see Note, The Reversion of
Hong Kong to China: Legal and Practical Questions, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 327, 328-33
(1985); Note, Hong Kong's Future: Can the People's Republic of China Invalidate the
Treaty of Nanking as an Unequal Treaty, 7 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 534 (1984).
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cated to the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on
the Situation With Regard to the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Countries and Peoples, that China would regain sovereignty over
Hong Kong when the conditions were ripe for negotiations.""
When Britain realized that its continued administration in Hong
Kong after 1997 was unrealistic" and that the imminent expiration of
the New Territories Lease would severely effect investors' confidence
in the colony, it started negotiations with China in the late 1970s con-
cerning the implementation of various arrangements to preserve the
prosperity of Hong Kong.49 By mid-1984, both sides came to an agree-
ment whereby Hong Kong, after 1997, would retain a high degree of
autonomy under Chinese sovereignty and would preserve the way of
life as it existed in its present socio-economic system.5 0 On September
26, 1984, delegates from both sides met for the momentous event 51 in
Beijing where both the Chinese and English versions of the agreement
were initialed by the delegation leaders.2
The Joint Declaration, together with the three Annexes and the
two Memoranda of Exchange, constitute the entirety of the agree-
ment." Each part of this bilateral agreement is of equal status and
collectively represents an international treaty which is binding on the
signing nations." Annex I contains an elaboration of Chinese policies
regarding the SAR in 1997 and the extent of autonomy and continuity
47. Huang Hua, a Chinese representative to the United Nations stated that "[tihe
settlement of the question of Hong Kong and Macau is entirely within China's sovereign
right and does not fall under the ordinary category of colonial territories .... [Tihe
Chinese government has consistently held that they should be settled in an appropriate
way when conditions are ripe." N. MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG
KONG 15-17 (1981).
48. WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 3. "[Tlhe continuation of British administration
after 1997 would not be acceptable to China in any form." Id. para. 10. Moreover, the
New Territories will revert to China in 1997 pursuant to the terms of the 1898 Conven-
tion, and the remainder of Hong Kong (Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the Stonecut-
ters Island) will not be viable alone. Id. at 7, 8.
49. Id. at 2. The governor of Hong Kong visited Beijing in 1979 at the invitation of
the Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade to discuss the specific land leases' expiration in
1997. The discussions, however, were unfruitful. Id.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id.
52. The Declaration was signed by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and
Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang on Dec. 19, 1984. Harding, The Future of Hong Kong,
CHINA Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 32-33. For a more thorough narration of the negotiation and ratifica-
tion process, see WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 2-5.
53. WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, para. 19.
54. Id.
19891
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which will then prevail. 55 Annex II describes the formation of a Sino-
British Joint Liaison Group ("JLG") and its functional role.56 Annex
III deals with both current land leases and those that are to be issued
between 1984 and 1997.51 Provisions are made for the arrangement of a
Joint Land Commission ("JLC") which will supervise all financial and
property transactions. 8 Both of the exchanged memoranda outline the
nationality issue of the people of Hong Kong.""
At the outset of the agreement, China declares that it will resume
sovereignty over Hong Kong effective July 1, 1997, and that Great
Britain will return the territory on the same date.60 Thereon, Hong
Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of China in accor-
dance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution.6
The SAR will be directly under the supervision of the Central People's
Government. The SAR, however, will be vested with its own executive,
legislative and independent judicial authority, including that of final
adjudication.62
The Joint Declaration further provides that the laws currently in
55. Id. para. 22.
56. The JLG was established to assist in a smooth transfer of sovereign between the
governments. It is an organ for liaison, not an organ of power. Its functions basically are:
1) to conduct consultation on the implementation of the Joint Declaration; 2) to discuss
matters relating to the smooth transfer of government in 1997; and 3) to exchange infor-
mation and conduct consultation on such subject as may be agreed by the two sides.
Id. at 26 (Annex II).
57. Id. para. 24.
58. Noting the crucial role that land plays in economic development, this Annex is of
particular importance to those foreign investors who currently hold land leases in Hong
Kong. Pursuant to the provisions, current leases that will expire before June 30, 1997,
can be renewed, and the rights of the leaseholder will be protected under the laws of the
SAR. Id. at 44. The Land Commission was established in 1985 pursuant to Annex III. It
is composed of three senior members on each side. It will continue to regulate land lease
transactions until July 1, 1997. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 40.
59. For a more detailed analysis of the legal status of Hong Kong residents under the
agreement, see Note, The Legal Aspect of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on the Fu-
ture of Hong Kong, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 167, 179-81 (1985).
60. Joint Declaration, supra note 8, paras. 1, 2.
61. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONST. OF 1982, art. 31. Article 31 stipulates that,
"the state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to
be instituted in the special administrative regions shall be prescribed by laws enacted by
the National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions." Id. The Letter
Patent and the Royal Instructions which are the current constitutional instruments for
the colony will then be revoked and substituted by the Basic Law. WHITE PAPER, supra
note 4, para. 2.
62. Joint Declaration, supra note 8, paras. 3(2), (3). Except for foreign and defense
affairs which are under the auspices of the Chinese government, the new SAR will enjoy
a high degree of autonomy. Id. Currently, the court of final appeal is the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council in London. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 35.
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force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged except for those
that contravene the Basic Law, which is to be promulgated by the Na-
tional People's Congress of China in accordance with its constitution."
More significantly, China has stipulated that the socialist system shall
not be practiced in the SAR and that the previous capitalist system
and lifestyle shall remain unchanged for the next fifty years."4 Further-
more, China stated that the rights and freedom of the residents of
Hong Kong shall be protected and that the provisions of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong
Kong shall remain inviolate.6 5
IV. IMPACT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION ON HONG KONG's RECENT
SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Although the foregoing provisions of the Joint Declaration appear
to be promising, many of Hong Kong's residents are still fearful as to
whether China will abide by the agreement.6 Tension over Hong
Kong's future in 1997 has brought about an exodus of professionals
from the colony. 7 Since Canada, Australia and the United States have
liberalized their immigration policies, many of Hong Kong's profes-
sional and business people, especially those in the financial and com-
puter industries, have sought emigration to these countries."8 Many of
the wealthy business emigrants must take their family assets with
them in order to satisfy the capital investment requirement for busi-
63. WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, Annex I, § I, at 14. The Basic Law will be considered
as a mini-constitution for the SAR. Lau, Positioning for Power, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug.
6, 1987 at 26, col. 3. It is currently being drafted with its first version available prospec-
tively in 1990. Oh, All Right, Says Hong Kong, 293 EcONOMIST, Dec. 1, 1984, at 43. Two
entities axe responsible for the promulgation of the Basic Law. The Basic Law Drafting
Committee (the "BLDC") and the Basic Law Consultation Committee (the "BLCC").
The former is a Beijing-appointed committee of 59 members, within which Hong Kong
holds 25 seats. Ignatius, Hong Kong's Premier Capitalist Roaders Are Emerging as Pe-
king Allies, ASIAN W. ST. J., Jan. 27, 1986, at 16, col. 2. The latter, an entity comprised of
180 members, is responsible for the collection of public opinions in Hong Kong. Lau,
Haste Makes Waste, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Dec. 19, 1985, at 14.
64. Joint Declaration, supra note 8, at Annex I, § 1, para. 1.
65. Id. Annex I, § XIII, para. 4.
66. Lau, On to Greener Pastures, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Jun. 18, 1987, at 22.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 22, cols. 1, 2. On October 1, 1987, the United States annual quota for Hong
Kong-born Chinese was increased from 600 to 5000. 7585 immigration applications were
received by the American Consulate in Hong Kong in 1986. Today, there are about
35,000 Hong Kong residents with approved applications awaiting their turn to emigrate.
Id.
1989]
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ness-migrant visas in the receiving nations. 9 It has been intimated
that the migration of these professionals represents a massive "brain
drain" from Hong Kong and threatens to dissipate the resources of the
business, financial and legal professionals, thus causing a slowdown in
the overall economic expansion."
The fear of living under a Communist regime further fueled the
exodus when Deng Xiaoping was impelled to dismiss his long-time po-
litical colleague, the liberal-minded secretary general of the Commu-
nist party, Hu Yaobang, after he was accused by other party members
for committing "mistakes on major issues of political principles."' A
subsequent anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign swept China.7 2 To
some sensitive Hong Kong residents, it might mean that the liberal-
minded reformists under Deng were not in full control and that the
conservatives might stage a political power struggle and prevail in a
possible comeback.73 The general consensus among observers is that
the phenomenon of emigration has yet to reach its crest and many feel
that the mid-1990s will prove to be the crunch years. 4 Consolation can
be found, however, in statistics from 1986 indicating that some 8000
former Hong Kong residents have returned to the colony on foreign
passports, after procuring citizenship or permanent resident status in
the Western countries.5
Another event of major political importance is China's continued
influence in the formation of Hong Kong's present and future constitu-
tional government. Proposals for direct elections of the Legislative
Council ("Legco") members have created a heated debate among polit-
ical factions in Hong Kong." Proponents believe that the introduction
69. An estimated U.S.$897,000,000 had been siphoned out of Hong Kong by
emigrants to Canada, Australia and the United States in 1986 alone. Id. at 23, col. 1. For
example, Australia requires business migrants to invest capital of at least U.S.$35Q,000
while entrepreneurs must invest a minimum of U.S.$100,000. Id.
70. Many executive search corporations are feeling the shortage of professional per-
sonnel. Id. at 22, col. 1. Furthermore, there is a general fear that if nothing is done to
halt this trend, the small number of these elite, well-qualified groups will continue to
further dwindle. Id. at 24, col. 3.
71. Gargan, Leader of Party in China is Ousted for His Mistakes, N.Y. Times, Jan.
17, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
72. Lau, supra note 66, at 24.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 22, col. 1.
75. Id. David Ford, the chief secretary of Hong Kong pointed to this as an encourag-
ing trend. Id.
76. Lau, Positioning for Power - Communists Step up Local Political Activity, FAR
E. ECON. REv., Aug. 6, 1987, at 26. The function of the Legislative Council is to enact
legislation and the appropriation of public funds. Presently, it has a maximum member-
ship of 57, comprised of the Governor, who is the President, three ex-officio members,
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of directly elected members will ensure a better representation of the
views and interests of the people." On the other hand, opponents ar-
gue that the elections might be manipulated by small, highly moti-
vated groups to secure elections of candidates not representative of the
community, thus undermining the internal stability as well as the over-
seas confidence in the future of the territory.7"
Beijing, as early as 1985, maintained its position that any signifi-
cant alteration in the internal structure of Hong Kong's existing con-
stitutional government initiated by Great Britain before 1997 could be
construed as an undertaking to interfere with Chinese sovereignty.
79 It
further asserted that any new formulation of the governmental super-
structure would have to wait until the Basic Law for the SAR is com-
pleted.80 Conversely, Britain claims that if a constitutional change in
the government is effected through consultation and direct franchise-
ment of the people, there is no reason to say that it will not converge
with the Basic Law.81 Arguably, both interpretations of the Joint Dec-
laration are of comparable validity.8 Since 1985, the tide favoring di-
the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Attorney General, seven official
members, 22 appointed members and 24 elected members. HoNG KONG 87, supra note 1,
at 18. The current debate over direct election primarily involves the percentage of Legco
members that will be elected and the methods through which voting will be conducted.
77. THE GREEN PAPEIe THE 1987 REviEw OF DEVELOPMENTS IN REPRESENTATIVE Gov-
ERNMENT 26 (May 1987)(on file at the office of the N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.) [here-
inafter GREEN PAPER]. "The purpose [of this Green Paper] is to consider whether the
system of representative government in Hong Kong should be further developed in 1988
and, if so, by what means." Id. para. 3(12).
78. Id. para. 104.
79. Bowring, Directing the Elections: Sino-British Row Over Words that Never
Were, FAR E. ECON. Rav., July 2, 1987, at 30. Xu Jiatun, local head of Xinhua News
Agency and Beijing's top man in Hong Kong, expressed Beijing's position that any politi-
cal reform in Hong Kong should be postponed until the Basic Law comes into effect in
1990. Wong, Hong Kong Jolted in China Attacks Political Reform, Asian W. St. J., Dec.
2, 1985, at 24, col. 3.
80. Bowring, supra note 79, at 30.
81. Id. at 31.
82. Undoubtedly, China must be referring to this clause: "[T]he legislature of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should be constituted by elections," Joint
Declaration, supra note 8, Annex I, § 1, which in turn is governed by paragraph 3(12)
that reads "[T]he above stated basic policies ... regarding Hong Kong. . . will be stipu-
lated in a Basic Law .... " Id. para. 3(12).
On the other hand, Britain must point to paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration which
reads:
The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's
Republic of China declare that, during the transitional period between the date
of entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30 June 1997, the Government
of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong
with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social
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rect elections has gradually gained momentum, and the opponents are
beginning to recognize that their objections are being outweighed by
the majority. 3 Hence, they concededly, yet tactfully, changed their
strategy. Instead of opposing the basic principle of direct elections, the
debate now is based upon the questions of timing and the percentage
of Legco members that should be elected through public referenda.8s
Anticipating a direct election in 1988, the Chinese Communist
Party (the "CCP") upgraded its activities in Hong Kong. 5 It sought to
establish itself as a powerful political entity and attempted to exert its
influence in the social and economic arenas.8
The CCP and many pro-Beijing organizations began to recruit and
mobilize supporters, identify competent candidates and isolate oppos-
ing political rivals for the 1988 election year.8 7 The campaign slogan
was for a united front and the changing of Hong Kong peoples' tradi-
tionally hostile attitudes towards the Communist party. The tech-
niques employed included the hosting of dinner parties, community
conventions and the arranging of trips to mainland China. 9 Many local
businessmen, professionals, aspiring politicians and neighborhood lead-
ers were flattered by the warm embrace; many responded enthusiasti-
cally to the Chinese invitations.8 A prominent sign of success of the
united front campaign and the grassroots politicking was the enlist-
ment of many dignitaries, judges and influential businessmen into the
organizing committee for the celebration of the Chinese National Day,
stability; and that the Government of the People's Republic of China will give
its cooperation in this connection.
Id. para. 4.
83. Lau, Yes, We Want No Elections, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Sept. 17, 1987, at 21. The
polls have consistently shown 50-60% support for direct elections, while 15-20% have
opposed them. Id.
84. Lau, All Talk and No Action, FAR E. EcoN. REv., July 30, 1987, at 32. For a more
thorough analysis of the debatable issues such as timing, method of elections, options for
1988, a new electoral college and size & balance of memberships on the Council, see
GREEN PAPER, supra note 77, paras. 105-115.
85. Lau, supra, note 76, at 26. CCP is an underground organization. Its existence in
Hong Kong is not officially proscribed. The Hong Kong government's position is quite
ambivalent toward political organizations; as long as they do not operate openly, their
roles are tolerated. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. CCP's overall activity is directly under Beijing's control. It is understood to be
headquartered within the Xinhua News Agency, whose director has always been both
Beijing's representative and head of the CCP organization in the colony. Id.
88. Id. at 27. "United Front" is a slogan used by China primarily in the context of
reuniting Taiwan with the mainland. It can be interpreted expansively as relating to any
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October 1, 1987, which was hosted by the Xinhua News Agency, Beij-
ing's de facto diplomatic voice in Hong Kong. 1
Britain's position has been criticized as obscure and unassertive.92
Furthermore, Britain is perceived as an unlikely proponent to insist on
introducing direct elections against Beijing's wishes-notwithstanding
a clear majority supporting such an undertaking-and that the only
hope would be if China were to withdraw its objections.9 8 According to
one commentator, the only thing that is clear amidst these political
uncertainties is that even if direct elections were introduced, they
would just be a token representation; China will still be the ultimate
controlling hand because the chief executive and the senior govern-
ment officials of the SAR would have to be approved and appointed by
the People's Central Government in Beijing.
9 4
Another controversy erupted when the Legislative Council enacted
interim regulations on July 8, 1987, legalizing the government's power
to censor those films which are considered seriously prejudicial to good
relations with territories outside of Hong Kong.99 Sir David Ford, the
chief secretary, defended the legislature, stating that the purpose of
the political film censorship was to prevent Hong Kong from being
used as a "propaganda base against other territories" 96 and that the
banning of a few films per year was a reasonable price to pay for secur-
ing harmony with other territories."
Earlier in 1987, Legco passed an amendment to the Public Order
Ordinance making it a criminal offense, punishable by up to two years
91. Lau, Grasping the Grassroots, FAR. E. ECON. REv., Aug. 6, 1987, at 26, 27.
92. Lau, supra note 83, at 21.
93. Id.
94. Lau, supra note 84, at 32. Reference is made to this particular provision in the
Joint Declaration- "[TIhe chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Gov-
ernment on the basis of the result of elections or consultations to be held locally. Princi-
pal officials will be nominated by the chief executive of the HKSAR for appointment by
the Central People's Government." Joint Declaration, supra note 8, para. 3(4).
A tripartite constitutional arrangement of the government structure for the SAR
was proposed by some members of the Basic Law Consultation Committee in 1987. The
proposal, however, did not entertain the possibility of setting up a bipartisan system
similar to that of the United States, because of fears that such an arrangement might
promote bickering among political factions. Sing Pao Daily, Oct. 25, 1987, at 1 (N.Y.
circulation, in Chinese).
95. Lau, Sense and Censorship: Films Must Not Offend Peking, FAR E. ECON. REv.,
July 23, 1987, at 12-13. The Censorship Bill of 1987 was promulgated in response to a
revelation made by an article published in the Asian Wall Street Journal, criticizing the
government for illegally banning films for the past 34 years and intended to continue
doing so despite having been advised to the contrary by the Legal Department. Id. at 12.
96. Id. at 13.
97. Id.
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of imprisonment, if the press or members of the media publicized
"false news" that might embarrass the government and cause alarm to
the public." An attempt to test the statute was made during a Legco
session when Attorney General Mitchell Thomas was requested to im-
pose criminal sanctions against a pro-Beijing Chinese magazine, Out-
look Weekly, for publishing "false news." 99 The magazine, in one of its
editions, quoted the deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macau Af-
fairs Office, Mr. Li Hou, as saying that the introduction of direct elec-
tions in 1988 would be a breach of the spirit of the Joint Declaration.'"0
When the remark was met with strong opposition, Li allegedly denied
that he ever made it.'01
The attorney general refused to press charges against the maga-
zine. "' Many critics perceived this refusal as selective application of
the law by the government, suggesting the possibility that the Chinese
authorities were above the law.' 03 Furthermore, they intimated that
both the film censorship and press control laws represent a gradual
erosion of Hong Kong's freedom of expression and that the laws might
even be in breach of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.'0 4
China's handling of independence protests in Tibet aroused some
uneasiness in the colony. In late September 1987, Tibetan Buddhist
monks demonstrated in central Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, protesting
what they asserted as Chinese mistreatment of the religious and civil-
ian population.10 5 The most violent riot occurred on October 1, 1987,
when an angry crowd of Tibetans burned down a police station. Four-
teen people died as a result of the uprising. 1° 6 The Chinese Govern-
98. Id. The amendment to the False News Bill of 1987 was passed in March 1987 by
Legco. Id.
99. Id. at 12. Legeo Session of July 8, 1987. Id.
100. Outlook Weekly (June 1987) (overseas edition, published in Hong Kong).
101. Lau, supra note 95, at 13.
102. Id. Mr. Thomas argued that the law should be used only as a last resort to
punish the press when it irresponsibly published a blatant falsehood. He added that the
dispute over whether Mr. Li had actually made such a statement to a particular reporter
was not within the purview of the law. Id.
103. Id. at 14.
104. Id. Reference was made to the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights as outlined in the Joint Declaration. See Joint Declaration, supra
note 8, Annex I, § XIII.
105. Gargan, Chinese Leader Faults U.S. Lawmakers on Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17,
1987, at 32, col. 2. Deng Xiaoping spoke out harshly against several American congress-
men for their statements on disturbances in Tibet, calling them ignorant and arrogant.
Id. at col. 1. For a comprehensive understanding of the Tibetan culture, see H. Rlmcahm-
SON, TIBET AND ITS HISTORY (1984).
106. Gargan, supra note 105, at 31, col. 3.
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ment responded quickly by banning any further processions around
the Jokhand Buddhist Temple, one of the holiest places for pil-
grimages in Tibet.1 0 7 It also prohibited Western reporters from cover-
ing the incident. 0 8 When the United States Congressional Human
Rights Caucas requested China's permission to visit Tibet, the request
was firmly denied by the Chinese authorities. 0 9
Many political observers theorized that the Tibetan riots might
give the conservative faction within the Communist party of the cen-
tral government a good reason to challenge the liberals' current polit-
ico-economic reforms in China." ° China's recent policies towards Tibet
and similar autonomous regions have been largely influenced by the
joint efforts of Hu Yaobang, the former secretary general, and Wan Li,
the vice premier."' After their official visit to Tibet in 1980, they pro-
posed to the central government that the custom and culture of the
region's inhabitants should be accorded greater deference and that the
Tibetans be given a more expansive role in the formation of their pro-
vincial government.' 2 The conservatives might construe the pro-inde-
pendence riot as an assault upon Deng Xiaoping's liberalization policy,
and an undermining of his conviction of building a modern China upon
the theory of "socialism with Chinese characteristics."
'" 3
The governor of Hong Kong, Sir David Wilson, had an opportu-
nity to voice his opinion about this issue during his first official visit to
the United States." 4 Speaking at a news conference, he affirmatively
107. Id. at 32, col. 2.
108. This can be inferred from the banning of "any processions around Jokhang Ca-
thedral,. . . the major site for pilgrimages in Tibet," by Chinese authorities. Id.
109. Id. at 32, col. 1. For China's viewpoint concerning Tibet's autonomy, see Re-
gional National Autonomy, BEIJING REV., Nov. 23-29, 1987, at 25.
110. Tibetan Riots will Affect the 13th Congress, Centre Daily News, Oct. 23, 1987,
at 9 (N.Y. circulation, in Chinese).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. In his opening speech at the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party held in September 1982, Deng Xiaoping "pointed out that we must integrate
the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, blaze a path of our
own and build socialism with chinese characteristic." Book Review, BEIJING REVIEW,
Sept. 21, 1987, at 33, col. 2. (reviewing DENG XIAOPING, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN PRESENT-
DAY CHINA (1987)).
114. Governor Wilson Promotes Hong Kong's Proper Image, Sing Tao Jih Pao, Oct.
24, 1987, at 26. The press conference was held in Washington, D.C. on Oct. 21, 1987. The
main purpose of his scheduled visit was to promote the image of Hong Kong and its
continued prosperity. Id. Interestingly enough, Wall Street suffered a major collapse on
Oct. 19, 1987 (the infamous Black Monday), and the Hong Kong stock exchange was
forced to close down for four consecutive days in an attempt to avoid financial disaster.
Mr. Wilson, described by most reporters as a good orator and lobbyist, responded
well to the questions posed to him. Among his many tactful, yet "evasive" answers, was
1989]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
dispelled any unnecessary fear with respect to the future of Hong Kong
vis a vis China's handling of the Tibetan incident." 5 He further as-
serted that a world of difference existed between the political situa-
tions of Hong Kong and Tibet-the former's autonomy being assured
expressly by an internationally binding treaty, while the latter was a
rebellious effort undertaken by a certain individual in an attempt to
gain independence from China.' 6 He acknowledged that, to a certain
extent, the fulfillment of the Joint Declaration would be contingent
upon the political forces in China; 1 7 however, he emphatically stated
that "Beijing has always reassured Hong Kong of its intentions to ad-
here by the Agreement whenever changes occur in China.""
Undeniably, the fears ascribed by the critics and pessimists are
not totally unfounded. There is, however, ample evidence to support
the inference that Hong Kong has rebounded significantly from its
early 1980 economic lull since the signing of the Joint Declaration." 9
V. HONG KONG'S ECONOMY AFTER THE SINO-BRITISH AGREEMENT
Hong Kong's economic recovery has been substantial since the rat-
ification of the Joint Declaration. The growth rate in real terms of its
Gross Domestic Product (an economic indicator) rose from 0.6% in
1985 '120 to 11% by 1986.121 The first half of 1987 evidenced further in-
his opinion that the solution for direct elections should be geared towards meeting the
changing political climate so that a more representative government could be established
to coincide with the long-term objective of the Joint Declaration. Id.
When he was questioned whether the Hong Kong Legislative Council would consider
repealing its newly enacted Press Control Act, he flatly answered in the negative. He
explained that the "new" law is actually one of the remaining "old" laws that Legco did
not invalidate, and that the only legislative change was to rename it as a "false news"
statute. Id. He further reasoned that the freedom of the press was never suppressed, nor
would he foresee any violation of this protected right in the future. Id.
115. Id.
116. The "certain individual" that Mr. Wilson spoke of was Dalai Lama, the highest
ranked living Buddhist monk in the Tibetan religion, who was exiled to India in 1959
after the Chinese government dissolved his rebellious efforts. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Wilson was specifically referring to the dismissal of the Communist party's
secretary general in January 1987, after students demonstrated statewide for observance
of human rights and a democratic government.
119. "Hong Kong's seemingly booming business," however, might be based upon
short-term investments, according to one analyst. Chao, One Country, Two Systems: A
Theoretical Analysis, in ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW 107, 117 (1987).
120. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 50.
121. HONG KONG ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE, HONG KONG MONTHLY ROUNDUP 2 (Oct.
1987) [hereinafter HONG KONG MONTHLY ROUNDUP] (available at the Hong Kong Eco-
nomic Affairs Office in New York, New York). The 11% figure was mentioned in the
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crease.' 22 According to the government's half-year economic reporter,
statistical comparisons with the same period in 1986 showed that ex-
port and re-exports increased by about 27% and 49%, respectively.'" 2
Domestic exports, in turn, depend upon the vitality of the manu-
facturing sector. 2" Currently, the clothing and textile industries are
Hong Kong's largest industries, accounting for some 40% of total do-
mestic export and about 43% of the industrial employees engaged in
manufacturing.
12 5
On April 23, 1986, Hong Kong became the ninety-first contracting
party to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (the "GATT"). 2s
The GATT is a multi-lateral international agreement that requires for-
eign products to be accorded equal treatment with domestic prod-
ucts. 127 Hong Kong is also a member of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement
(the "MFA"), a society formed by countries involved in international
textile trading.
2 8
Although Hong Kong possesses a high degree of autonomy regard-
ing the conduct of its external commercial trade, the growing senti-
ments of protectionism among Western industrial nations pose a threat
to Hong Kong's export-based economy. 2  For instance, in December
1985, President Reagan vetoed the Textile and Apparel Trade Enforce-
ment Bill (more popularly known as the "Jenkins Bill").2 0 A subse-
quent vote in Congress failed to override the presidential veto by a
very narrow margin.' The closeness of the ballot evidenced the grow-
address by Hong Kong's financial secretary at the Hong Kong Economic Association, on
Sept. 21, 1987.
122. Id.
123. HONG KONG MONTHLY ROUNDUP, supra note 121, at 2 (Sept. 1987).
124. See generally HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 63. It is estimated that 90% of
Hong Kong's manufactured products are eventually exported, thus accounting for some
22% of the gross GDP and 36% of total employment. Id.
125. Id. at 64.
126. Id. at 29. Before this date, Hong Kong's participation in GATT was within the
United Kingdom's delegation. Id. Hong Kong is now an active member of GATT in ac-
cordance with Article XXVI (5)(c) of the agreement. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 4,
para. 24.
127. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 613 (5th ed. 1979).
128. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 29-30. Both the Chinese and British govern-
ments have declared and recognized Hong Kong as a separate contracting party to the
GATT and MFA in the years leading to and beyond 1997. Id. at 30. Queries have been
posed by some critics as to whether China may in the future restrict Hong Kong's inde-
pendent representation in these entities under the pretext of the "foreign affairs clause"
when Hong Kong's continued success and prosperity may encroach upon China's "mar-
ket-share." Joint Declaration, supra note 8, Annex 1, § XI.
129. See HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 13.
130. H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 5582 (1985).
131. 132 CONG. REc. H5506-02 (1986).
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ing trend of protectionism."3 2
Some analysts speculated that the New York Stock Exchange
crash in October 1987 would trigger a series of congressional enact-
ments trimming the federal deficit, which may include reducing United
States trade imbalances with foreign nations.13 3 When the United
States Foreign Trade Commissioner urged Hong Kong to raise its ex-
change rate against the United States Dollar, many Hong Kong busi-
nessmen interpreted this as another protectionist move.'" It was ru-
mored that some investors in Hong Kong were prompted to sell their
United States currency holding in fear of its imminent drop in value. 3 5
On the other hand, overseas investment in Hong Kong has been on
the upswing. For example, during the first half of 1987, six new insur-
ance companies, four of which were overseas, procured authorization
from the government for opening business. 3 e Fourteen more overseas
corporations are reportedly awaiting approval of their applications. 37
In light of the rising number of overseas investment advisors, the Hong
Kong government plans to establish a committee to monitor their in-
creasing activities. 38
Japanese firms are among the many foreign investors showing a
strong interest in establishing manufacturing plants in the territory. 39
Recently, Nukabe, an auto component manufacturer, purchased an in-
dustrial plant for making high precision parts for fuel injection and
power steering systems."0 Shinagawa, another Japanese firm, bought a
factory for the production of die cast parts and carburetors for
vehicles.""
International Business Machines ("IBM") has also announced its
intentions to make Hong Kong a site for its headquarters in Asia and
132. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 69. "The bill, if enacted, would have reduced
Hong Kong's textile exports of cotton, wool and man-made fiber to the United States by
about 13 percent and other fiber by possibly as much as seventy percent." Id.
133. Li, Wilson, The Superb Lobbyist, Centre Daily News, Oct. 23, 1987, at 9 (N.Y.
circulation, in Chinese).
134. Id.
135. Id. Since Oct. 17, 1983, the Hong Kong Dollar has been linked to the United
States Dollar through an arrangement in the note- issue mechanism at a fixed rate of
exchange: H.K.$7.80 = U.S.$1.00. The objective of the Hong Kong government was to
stabilize the fluctuation in its declining economy in 1983 through a linkage with the
United States Dollar, and the method has been successful.
136. HONG KONG MONTHLY ROUNDUP, supra note 121, at 3 (Aug. 1987).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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the Pacific Basin outside of Japan.1 4 2 The division based in Hong Kong
will be responsible for managing accounts with China, Korea, Taiwan,
all of southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand." '
Since 1985, China has been the most valuable trading partner of
Hong Kong."" In 1986, the value of trade exchanged between the two
amounted to some HK$140,000,000,000.I" China is the second largest
market for Hong Kong's domestic export, and is the largest supplier of
goods to the colony.1 4 6 In 1986, more than three-fourths of Hong
Kong's re-export trade was China-related, either as a market or as a
source of supply.
47
Besides being an important trade partner, Hong Kong also pro-
vides China with easy access to the global financial market." 8 Re-
cently, the Bank of China, through one of its subsidiaries, China Devel-
opment Investment, purchased four percent of the shares of the Bank
of Far East Asia, the third largest Hong Kong incorporated bank."
49
Although the proportionate share purchased was small, it symbolized
the growing alliance of Hong Kong's banking industry with mainland
China. 50 In fact, during the stock market crash in October 1987, the
Bank of China volunteered to participate in a $256,000,000 rescue
package drawn up to save Hong Kong's Future Exchange Market. 5 '
The investors' approval and appreciation of Beijing's good will by help-
ing Hong Kong with its difficulties was reflected in a 6.9% gain in the
index after a 33% precipitous drop earlier in the same week. 2
In recent years, China has diversified its investments in Hong
Kong from trading and banking to other areas such as joint-property
development.'5 In 1985, China Light and Power, a Hong Kong corpo-
ration, entered into a joint venture contract with China for the con-
struction of China's first nuclear power plant in Guangdong, a province
contiguous with Hong Kong territory. '"' In late 1987, China, together
142. HONG KONG MONTHLY ROUNDUP, supra note 121, at 4 (Aug. 1987).
143. Id.
144. HONG KONG 87, supra note 1, at 49.
145. Id. It is equivalent to U.S.$18,000,000,000.
146. Id. In 1986, goods exported to Hong Kong from China accounted for 30 percent
of the colony's total annual import value; while Hong Kong export to China represented
12 percent of its total domestic export value. Id.
147. Id.
148. Mulcahy, Heavy-weight Support, FAR E. ECON. Rpv., Aug. 27, 1982, at 48.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 48.
151. Hong Kong Loses Brokers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1987, at B10, col. 4.
152. Id.
153. The Era of the Bull, ASIAN FIN., Mar. 15, 1985, at 40.
154. Id.
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with a few multinational firms, submitted bids to build Hong Kong's
longest tunnel, a twin-tube of about 2.5 miles connecting the eastern
part of Kowloon with the New Territories.1 55 Construction cost is esti-
mated to be around U.S.$300,000,000, and completion is expected
sometime in 1992.156
Other examples of the government's preparation for the coming
years include the construction of a major highway that links Hong
Kong directly with Guangzhou, the capital city of the Guangdong
Province.'57 The project is in the third phase of its five phase plan, and
is budgeted at a cost of around U.S.$167,000,000.158 Likewise, an air-
port is currently under consideration by the Civil Aviation Depart-
ment. 5 9 A special committee is being set up to investigate all the
ramifications, in anticipation of increased air traffic in the future
years. 6 o
The increasing economic interdependence between Hong Kong
and China has been mutually advantageous, and hopefully will serve as
an added assurance of the continued prosperity of Hong Kong after
1997, provided that China will continue to realize benefits from its cur-
rent modernization program.
VI. CURRENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CHINA
The opening session of the 13th Congress of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party on October 25, 1987, seems to have laid down the blueprint
for a massive reorganization of the Politburo in an effort to catch up
with the prospering economic modernization program that China has
already undertaken. 6'
Zhao Ziyang, the acting party leader'62 and prime minister, in his
two and a half hour long speech,6 s remarked openly on the major de-
155. HONG KONG MONTHLY ROUNDUP, supra note 121, at 4 (Oct. 1987).
156. Id.
157. HONG KONG MONTHLY ROUNDUP, supra note 121, at 4 (Aug. 1987).
158. Id.
159. HONG KONG MONTHLY ROUNDUP, supra note 121, at 4 (Sept. 1987).
160. Id.
161. Gargan, More Change Due in China's Economy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1988, at
Al, col. 1. This was the first time since the founding of the Communist party in 1921
that China has opened its Congress to Western reporters. Id. at All, col. 1. The 1936
member Congress consisted of leaders gathered from around the country. Id. The con-
gressional agenda called for a week-long debate, discussion and approval of the plans
proposed by the government in the field of political and economic reform. Id.
162. World J., Nov. 3, 1987 at 1 (N.Y. circulation, in Chinese). Zhao Ziyang was for-
mally elected as the next party leader on Nov. 2, 1987. Id.
163. The 32,000 word report was translated into six languages. Sing Pao Daily News,
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fects in the existing political bureau, criticizing the system as being
overstaffed, confused, corrupt, feudalistic and burdened with bureau-
cratic excesses. 16 He called for the decentralization of the party power,
insisting that the cadre system should remove itself from the adminis-
tration of government, industry and the public sector. 65 He proposed
the establishment of a civil service system whereby successful candi-
dates would be selected on the basis of qualification and performance
in statewide examinations.'
While discussing the economic aspect, Zhao reaffirmed the coun-
try's commitment to building socialism with democracy"6 7 by stating
that because the current socialist reform is only at its primordial stage,
Western economic and capitalistic means should be let in to supple-
ment the socialist end.16 8 He acknowledged that China will continue to
allow the small private sector to flourish free from undue state inter-
vention, while reserving the major industries under government con-
trol. "' He also supported the theory that market forces would regulate
supply and demand-a notion challenged by the orthodox Marxists as
capitalist-instead of having state planners traditionally making deci-
sion about market pricing. 70
Oct. 27, 1987, at 12 (N.Y. circulation, in Chinese). The report underwent six revisions,
suggesting that extensive negotiations and concessions were made before reaching the
final version. Id. An English translation is reprinted in Zhao, Along the Road of Social-
ism With Chinese Characteristics, BEIJING REV., Nov. 9-15, 1987, at 23.
164. Zhao, supra note 163, at 23-49.
165. Id.
166. Id. Present government positions are filled according to lists that are compiled
by the party committee. Gargan, supra note 161, at All, col. 3. Sometimes, the appoin-
tees are neither interested nor knowledgeable in their assigned positions. Id.
167. Zhao, supra note 163, at 24. Deng Xiaoping, the central figure and forerunner in
China's political and economic movement, laid down two central tasks of economic re-
construction: 1) to uphold the four cardinal principles; and 2) to adhere to the policy of
reform and opening to the outside world. The four cardinal principles are upholding: 1)
the socialist road, 2) the people's democratic dictatorship, 3) the leadership of the Com-
munist party of China; and 4) Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. Zhau, Book
Review, BEIJING REV., Sept. 21, 1987 at 33-34 (reviewing X. DENG, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES
IN PRESENT DAY CHINA (1987)).
168. Zhao, supra note 163, at 25; see also, Gargan, supra note 160, at All, col. 1.
"[E]xpanded markets for means of production, funds, technology, labor service, and the
issuance of stocks & bonds are phenomena which are not peculiar to capitalism. Social-
ism can and should make use of them, trying in the meantime to minimize their negative
effects in practice." Id.
169. Zhao, supra note 163, at 29.
170. Id. This means changing from direct to indirect management by the govern-
ment. For an in-depth analysis of this theory, see Xu, The Changing Function of the
Government in the Transformation of China, CHINA LAW AND GOVERNMENT, Spring,
1987, at 26.
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Reference was also made to the rejuvenation of the Communist
party's core leadership. 7' The replacement of the elderly leaders, most
of them now in their eighties, with the younger, college-educated gen-
eration is regarded as an important process for the perpetuation of the
present popular policies on reform and modernization.'72 It is believed
that the replacement has to take place now while the principal policy-
makers are still living and in good health, so that a smooth transition
will be ensured in order for the country to maintain its steady political
course.17 3 Deng Xiaoping, the mastermind behind this massive scheme,
has announced his resignation from the Politburo Standing Committee
to set an example for the others to follow.'
Results from the nationwide survey released on August 17, 1987,
by the China Social Survey System (the "CSSS") was a determinative
factor in buttressing the Communist party's conviction to press ahead
with the country's reform.175 The 13th Congress held in October 1987,
certainly seems to have reaffirmed the aspiration of the public opinion;
many Chinese citizens see the establishment of CSSS as a major step
in China's democratization process.
7
1
While many congressional representatives and political observers
praised Zhao Ziyang's speech as "bold, unabashed, comprehensive and
flawless," some misgivings were shared as to whether the moderniza-
tion blueprint would be carried out without opposition from the stern
Marxist conservatives who still hold a substantial number of important
positions in the political arena. 77 It is feared that the establishment of
the civil service examination, compounded with the decentralization of
party power, would lead to the proliferation of excessive personnel in
the system if the existing party members, who are generally less edu-
cated than their younger counterparts, are allowed to stay. 78 The
171. Zhao, supra note 164; see also Sing Tao Jib Pao, Oct. 27, 1987 at 12 (N.Y. circu-
lation, in Chinese).
172. Chinese Leaders to Become Younger, BEIJING REV., Sept. 21, 1987, at 28.
173. Id.
174. Sing Tao Jib Pao, Oct. 31, 1987 at 1. The headline reads: "All eighty year olds
are-to retire from the Politburo; Deng Xiaoping's resignation from the Central Commit-
tee is reassured at the 13th Congress: the Party Constitution will be rewritten so that
Deng will serve as the chairman of the State Military Commission in accordance with
public demand." Id.
175. China to Monitor Public Opinion, BEIJING REV., Sept. 7, 1987, at 6. The large
scale surveys were the first ever made by China's professional poll organization. Accord-
ing to the results of the opinion poll, 64 percent of those surveyed were satisfied with the
current economic reforms, while 93 percent thought a political restructuring would be
necessary. Id.
176. Id.
177. Sing Pao Daily News, Oct. 27, 1987, at 12.
178. Sing Tao Jib Pao, Oct. 27, 1987, at 23. Mr. Lee Yee, a prominent political ob-
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threat of losing their job security and the possibility of being relegated
to positions of lesser importance continue to plague the minds of many
"tenured" senior Marxist conservatives.7 9 Their fight to deter or to
postpone the imminent political restructuring by basing their argu-
ment upon the strict adherence to the socialist road8 0 and pointing
their fingers at the current nationwide inflation "8 ' may be felt in the
coming years.
VII. APPLICATION OF THE "ONE COUNTRY, Two SYSTEMS" CONCEPT
China's current massive economic and political reform is based on
two closely interwoven concepts: the building of socialism with Chinese
characteristics' 2 and the establishing of a "one country, two systems"
structure. 8s China hopes that through the interaction and amalgama-
tion of these two principles it will advance technologically, financially
and politically.
84
According to one commentator, the phrase "one country, two sys-
tems" started to gain international recognition after Deng Xiaoping's
meeting with Margaret Thatcher in September 1982 in Beijing to dis-
cuss Hong Kong's future.' It was said that Beijing sought to solve
the Taiwan issue' 86-the reunification of Taiwan with mainland
server in Hong Kong, speculated that the process would generate in excess of one million
cadres and therefore be considered as "featherbedded employees." Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The political conservatives have always considered an economy based upon
free market forces as anti-socialist and non-conforming to party principles. Id.
181. Rosario, The Power of the Purse, FAR E. EcoN. REv., June 18, 1987, at 76. Ac-
cording to what is generally regarded as an underestimate of official statistics, many
western observers said that the cost of living for Chinese workers rose by an annual
average of 9.5% in 1985-86, as compared with a mere 2% increase in prior years. Despite
inflation, however, China's average citizen has realized heightened real purchase
power-increased wages have offset the rise in commodity prices. Id. From 1984 to 86,
the per capita income of rural and urban workers increased by an average of 11% and
20% respectively, while the indexes for workers' cost of living rose by 7.2% and 6%
respectively. Id.
182. See supra notes 113 & 164-71 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
184. Chu, supra note 44, at 77.
185. Chao, supra note 119, at 108.
186. Taiwan is a large island in the Pacific off the eastern coast of mainland China.
In 1949, after the Nationalist Chinese party headed by Chiang Kai-shek was defeated by
the Communist party, the former sought refuge in Taiwan. Since then, the island has
been the seat of the Nationalist Government - the Republic of China. See supra notes
32 & 88 and accompanying texts.
Taiwan has always maintained that it is the legitimate government of China, and
that it will recover the mainland in the future. In the 1970s, however, its international
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China-through the application of this seemingly paradoxical
concept.
8 7
In 1982, China amended its state constitution.' Article 31 of the
constitution stipulates that where necessary, Beijing may establish spe-
cial administrative regions whose systems will be determined by the
National People's Congress in accordance with specific conditions. 89
Since then, China has signed separate treaties with two foreign coun-
tries: Britain and Portugal.' Both Hong Kong and Macao, 19' pres-
ently colonies of Britain and Portugal respectively, will become future
status suffered a major setback. In 1971, the UN General Assembly voted to oust Taiwan
and replace it with the People's Republic of China (the "PRC") in all UN organs, includ-
ing the Security Council. When United States President Nixon visited the PRC in 1972,
he explicitly acknowledged that Taiwan is a province of China. By 1979, the United
States declared an end to all United States-Taiwan mutual security treaties. For an ex-
tensive coverage of Taiwan's history and government, see 22 COLLIER's ENCYCLOPEDIA 39
(1988); 26 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 233 (1987).
On Jan. 1, 1979, the Standing Committee of the PRC issued a letter to Taiwan
which said, "IW]e honestly expect the people of Taiwan to be reunited with the mother-
land soon," and when the reunification is realized, "the status quo and local opinion will
be treated with respect." Chao, supra note 119, at 107 (quoting collections of records
from the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress).
187. Chao, supra note 119, at 109. The concept of "one country, two systems" can be
interpreted as allowing the practice of capitalism within a socialist regime. China has
boasted that "this concept is a new invention that is scientific and a major design con-
nected with orthodox Marxism-Leninism." Id.
188. Id. at 118.
189. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONST. OF 1982 art. 31.
190. In addition to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 8, China also en-
tered into an agreement with Portugal in 1987 with respect to the future of Macao. See
Declaracao Conjunta Sino-Portuguesa Sobre A Questao De Macau [Joint Declaration of
the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic
of Portugal on the Question of Macao], Apr. 12, 1987, People's Republic of China-Portu-
gal, 1987 Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Tiaoyue Ji (People's Republic of China) [here-
inafter Sino-Portuguese Declaration].
China and Portugal reached an agreement on returning Macao, a Portugese colony
for 430 years, to China in 1999. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1987, § 1, at 11, col. 6. The agree-
ment was initialed by both governments on Mar. 26, 1987. The signing took place on
Apr. 13, 1987 when Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva of Portugal met with Zhao
Ziyang in Beijing to complete the formal ceremony. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1987, § 1, at 12,
col. 3.
191. Macao, also known as Macau, is a Portugese territory located on the southern
shore of mainland China. The enclave is a narrow peninsula of about six square miles
and is located some 40 miles west of Hong Kong. Although 97% of its 420,000 inhabi-
tants are Chinese, Macao has been governed by an almost wholly Portugese administra-
tion since 1557. The city is sprinkled with gambling casinos and massage parlors. Its
economy depends on the 4.2 million tourists - mostly Hong Kong residents - who visit
every year. For a more detailed historical narration of Macao, see 15 COLLIER's ENCYCLO-
PEDIA 145 (1988).
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SARs of China-Hong Kong in 1997 and of Macao in 1999.192 It has
been persuasively argued that it is possible that Beijing may succeed in
its Taiwan reunification bid 9 ' if China permits the SARs, which are
direct outgrowths of the "one country, two systems" concept, to flour-
ish independently.
Taiwan's traditionally hostile attitude toward mainland China
seemed to have softened in September 1987 when the Taiwanese gov-
ernment allowed its citizens to visit China.'9 4 This change in its diplo-
macy was regarded by many political analysts as a positive step to-
wards the pacification and reconciliation of relations across the
Formosa Strait. 95 The death of Chiang Ching-kuo, president of Tai-
wan, on January 13, 1988, however, has led many observers to specu-
late about whether the recently initiated "normalization" process be-
tween the two Chinas will be furthered in the coming years.9 6 Chiang's
political successor, Lee Teng-hui, is native Taiwanese, and the first mi-
nority member of the Nationalist party of Taiwan to have attained a
top governmental position.'9 7 Although known to be an advocate for
the continuance of moderate changes, Lee has reportedly vowed to up-
192. Sino-Portugese Declaration, supra note 190, §§ 1-2, at 59, 60.
1. The Government of the People's Republic of China (China) and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Portugal declare that the Macao area . . . is Chinese
territory, and that . . . China will resume the exercise of sovereignty over
Macao with effect from 20 December 1999.
2. China declares that in line with the principle of "one country, two systems,"
China will pursue the following basic policies regarding Macao:
(1) In accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of
China, China will establish a Macao Special Administrative Region
(SAR) of China upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Macao.
(2) The Macao SAR will . . . enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in
foreign and defense affairs ... [and] be vested with executive, legislative
and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication.
Id.
Almost all the provisions of the Sino-British and the Sino- Portugese Declarations
are mirror images of each other. The guarantees of autonomy contained in the Declara-
tions are similar to those China had promised Hong Kong. Facts on File, Weekly World
News Digest Index, Mar. 26, 1987, at 220, col. A2 (published in New York by Facts on
File, Inc.).
193. See, e.g., Note, The Recovery of Hong Kong, 11 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 625, 648
(1984); Note, An Economic Analysis of Capital Flight in Hong Kong, 17 N.Y.U. INrr'L L.
& POL. 683, 714 (1985); Note, Legal Aspect of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on the
Future of Hong Kong, 20 Tax. INT'L L.J. 167, 199 (1985).
194. Taiwan Liberates its Citizens' Visitation Rights to Mainland China, Centre
Daily News, Sept. 30, 1987, at 1 (N.Y. circulation, in Chinese).
195. Id.
196. Centre Daily News, Jan. 23, 1988, at 1 (N.Y. circulation, in Chinese).
197. In Taiwan, Rumblings About Another Chiang, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1988, at
L28, col. 2.
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hold the Nationalist's policy of non-negotiations concerning reunifica-
tion 1 with mainland China. Thus, the prospect of the Taiwan issue
seems uncertain and strained.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The road to democratization in a government based upon a
groundwork of centralized, authoritarian rule is tortuous and obstacle-
filled. The process is complex and time-consuming. It requires that the
political power, a source of psychic euphoria and superiority that men
have always sought, be shared by those that are currently holding it.
Although such a notion seems almost inconceivable and whimsical,
such an undertaking is plausibly justified if democratic reforms can be
thought of as a process of erecting a broader base of power that can
strengthen the foundation of a political system and forestall future rev-
olutionary changes. If the reformists and the conservatives in China
can reach an agreement which places the betterment of the country's
interests above individual gains, the prospects of building a modern
China is within tangible grip.
The country has advanced financially in the past decade since
China began its open door and economic liberalization policies. More-
over, its economic gain is especially striking in the Special Economic
Zones when compared with the poorer, less industrialized northwestern
provinces. Thus, China's realization of its national economic growth
through the implementation of Western financial formulations may
also insure Hong Kong of its continued prosperity after the reversion
of the latter's sovereignty back to China. Additionally, the 13th Con-
gress appeared to have laid down long-term provisions to achieve the
goal of modernization. Many observers believe that Hong Kong will
reap the benefits.199
Concededly, it seems that China has attempted and succeeded in
exerting her omnipresent and omnipotent influence upon Hong Kong's
structuring of its future government for fear that the latter may be-
come too unmanageable. It is unlikely that Great Britain will challenge
her-at least not directly-even if she breaches the terms of the Joint
Declaration, nor will the international community invoke any punitive
measures against her except for the possible implementation of eco-
nomic sanctions. Yet, it can be argued that China will not jeopardize
198. Id.
199. Sing Tao Jih Pao, Oct. 27, 1987, at 3 (N.Y. circulation, in Chinese). Qiu Nan,
China's Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs said, "[Tihe report is good news to Hong
Kong." Id.
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the prosperity of Hong Kong and injure the symbiotic relationship
which has existed so beneficially between the two entities. China's ad-
herence to the letter and spirit of the Joint Declaration will not only
uphold her reputation in international business circles, something she
cherishes if she is to remain committed to her open door economic pol-
icy, but may lead the way to another more far reaching goal-the in-
ducement of Taiwan to reunite with the motherland through peaceful
means.
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